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Abstract 
 
In the UK the majority of additional affordable housing is provided either with the help of up-front 
grants (Social Housing Grant) allocated to social landlords or through developer contributions to 
affordable housing on market sites.  There is a significant gap in affordable housing policies aimed 
at helping those a little further up the income scale who are still unable to afford acceptable 
housing especially in pressure areas.  Equally, developers see little reason to concentrate on the 
affordable end of the market. 
 
The paper reports on a survey of policies applied in a range of countries, which might have some 
value within the UK context.  This entailed a short questionnaire of relevant experience and of 
available evidence on the evaluation of available instruments.  The survey showed that, while there 
was a wide range of mechanisms available the majority concentrated on subsidies, which, in a UK 
context, could add more to prices than to output.  Others provided useful insights into possibilities 
for encouraging provision for the intermediate market.  On the basis of the available evidence a 
possible package of measures with the potential for assisting provision of affordable is developed.  
 
1. Introduction:  The Problem 
 
A particular concern in the UK at the present time is that there is inadequate assistance for low-
income employed households who are unable to gain access to traditional social housing but who 
are unable to afford adequate accommodation from their own resources. 
 
The UK support system is generous in terms of housing cost payments for households who have no 
working members or on the very lowest pay but provides little or no help for those on incomes 
above that level.  This problem of affordability is illustrated in figure 1 – which shows the large 
gap in housing costs between those renting social housing and those who have to depend on the 
lower end of the market.  Equally, the evidence suggests strongly that the market is not prepared to 
provide for this group of households.  New supply is running far below that required to meet the 
needs even of newly emerging households and the balance between households and dwellings has 
tightened dramatically (Barlow et al, 2002).  Moreover the planning obligation (Section 106) policy 
introduced in the 1990s which requires that a proportion of affordable housing be provided on 
market developments is adding relatively few additional affordable homes to the stock (Crook et al, 
2001).   
 
It was in this context that we were asked to examine the range of fiscal incentives available across 
the world to assess whether there were lessons to be learned by the UK government to help them 
fill the gap. 
  
Objectives and methodology 
 
The objectives of the research included: 
 
(a) to identify what policy instruments might be available to increase the supply of affordable 
housing; 
(b) to identify what policy instruments might be available to tackle the problem of affordable 
housing through routes other than supply; 
(c) to analyse the likely impact of such instruments. 
 
Information on fiscal instruments to promote affordable housing was collected from books and 
journals, a web search, questionnaires sent to housing-finance experts from Germany, Australia, 
France, Denmark, Sweden, the Netherlands, Finland, and the US, and discussions held with other 
academics in the UK.  Having collected information about international fiscal instruments, we 
categorised the policies according to whether they affected supply or demand, and whether they 
were subsidies or worked through the tax system.  
 
Framework for analysis 
 
The objectives of policy instruments, and particularly of fiscal incentives, include (i) to change 
consumer income and therefore the capacity to pay for affordable housing; (ii) to change the price 
of affordable housing to consumers in order to increase the incentive to purchase or rent adequate 
accommodation; and (iii) to increase the incentive to suppliers to provide affordable housing. 
 
Comparative static analysis has traditionally suggested that income subsidies give higher utility to 
consumers, mainly because of the benefits of choice.  Similarly, price subsidies without constraints 
on choice give higher value than constrained-choice price subsidies – which may operate to 
increase the capacity to purchase other goods and services rather than housing itself.  Therefore in 
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well-operating, rapidly adjusting markets the emphasis tends to be on helping low-income 
households directly. 
 
However, where there are additional social benefits to ensuring housing standards, or constraints on 
supply adjustment or distributional objectives, it will often be more appropriate to concentrate 
assistance on supply and prices.  In particular, where the price elasticity of demand for a basic 
necessity is limited above a certain quality, price subsidies to help people achieve a minimum of 
quality will meet both distributional and efficiency aims as compared to income subsidies (Bos, 
1991).  These attributes are usually thought to apply to minimum standards of affordable housing. 
 
The question as to whether price subsidies should be directed at demand or supply has been a 
matter of much academic and policy discussion.  In principle in well-operating markets the 
question is irrelevant - as Figure 1 shows, both the impact on output and on the price paid by the 
consumer will be the same.  However reality is likely to be different because of the transactions 
and adjustment costs involved as well as because of the relevant institutional framework. In the 
United States the presumption in the literature is heavily in favour of demand-side subsidies for 
efficiency reasons (Housing Studies special issue, 2002).  Galster, for instance, who is well aware 
of the arguments, suggests that “Problem definition, goal weighting, and metropolitan, housing 
market, socio-economic and governmental characteristics collectively must be considered before an 
unambiguously ‘best’ housing strategy can be identified” but then concludes “The demand-side 
approach, however, can claim a wider range of goals over which it demonstrates comparative 
advantage” (Galster, 1997).   The reason for this conclusion is that housing markets should be seen 
as a series of sub-markets.  Demand-side subsidies allow people to be mobile upwards into higher-
quality sub-markets and supply and price will then adjust to that shift in demand.  Yates and 
Whitehead (1998) responded by suggesting that, at the least, there should be greater agnosticism as 
to their relative effectiveness.  They argued that the US market was not typical of most housing 
markets, especially in Europe.  The particular context in which markets operate, the specific design 
of delivery mechanisms, in particular the role of the social sector, and the potential effects on social 
segregation should all be taken into consideration before coming to a conclusion.  Equally the 
political pressures towards using lower taxes rather than increased public expenditure can be 
important. Even so, it is recognised that there is no guarantee that supply subsidies delivered 
through bureaucratic procedures will necessarily be more effective because administrative failures 
are just as prevalent as market failures (Maclennan and More, 1997).  What therefore is most 
important is not the debate about demand versus supply subsidies per se, but an examination of 
what prevents either from achieving their goals.   
 
These conclusions suggest that much of the emphasis should be on the effectiveness of the 
administrative framework, the linkages between different instruments, the potential impacts and, 
especially, relevant price elasticities. 
 
Evidence on price elasticities 
 
The most important price elasticity in terms of the likely outcome of any fiscal instrument is the 
price elasticity of supply  - of affordable housing, housing in general, and land in particular.  If, for 
instance, the price elasticity of supply of housing were to be completely inelastic then the impact of 
either a demand subsidy or a supply subsidy would be wholly to increase price (Figure 2b).  Any 
impact would then be limited to redistribution between affordable housing, where the subsidy was 
concentrated (reducing the relative price faced by consumers and suppliers in this submarket), and 
the unsubsidised sector where prices would increase. 
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If, which is somewhat more realistic, it is the price elasticity of the supply of land which is 
completely inelastic it may be possible to obtain some additional housing through the impact on 
increased densities.  However the greatest effect will still be on prices rather than output. The 
evidence on price elasticities of supply of land, and therefore the supply of new housing overall, 
suggests that adjustment in Britain is very slow and that price elasticities are low (Whitehead, 
1999; Malpezzi and Maclennan, 2000;  Bramley 1993;  Monk et al, 1996). Empirical evidence in 
England suggests that they do vary between regions and that, rather surprisingly, elasticities might 
be higher for London than for many other regions (Cheshire and Shepherd, 2000).  What is 
undoubtedly the case is that the land-use planning system plays a major role in determining 
production in its effect both on the amount of land made available and the capacity to vary density 
in response to price increases (Bramley et al, 1995).  The most important pressures to adjust land 
supply and densities may also be as much political as direct responses to price change (Barter and 
Jarvis, 2000).  
 
This evidence suggests in the UK context that policies that can achieve additional land and housing 
are likely to be particularly effective in the addressing the affordable housing problem.  At the 
present time, while affordable housing is a “material consideration” in planning terms (i.e. the 
planning authority may take it directly into account when making the decision), its provision will 
not generally directly affect overall land supply.  It is suggested that the supply of accommodation 
from within the housing stock may be rather more price elastic, and that an increase in price may 
elicit responses such as bringing dwellings back into use, conversions to smaller units and the 
transfer from commercial and other uses to housing. However the empirical evidence on this is 
limited and there are obvious problems in relation to standards and the location and appropriateness 
of vacant units (Kleinman et al, 1999).   
 
The extent of substitution between affordable and market housing – i.e., the extent to which 
affordable housing is occupied by households who could afford to pay for market housing-- is 
equally unclear, although there is undoubtedly some such substitution.  In the other direction, to the 
extent that affordable housing comes from the existing market sector, assisting one group of 
households put pressures on the other. 
 
On the demand side, the evidence suggests that price elasticities are certainly less than one and may 
be very much less, while income elasticities are probably close to one (Whitehead, 1999).  Thus, if 
additional income is provided, demand will rise roughly in proportion.  There will be limited 
supply response.  To restrict demand in the market sector will require therefore significant price 
adjustment.   Additional complications arise from expectational changes in response to price 
increases in both supply and demand. 
 
The evidence on price elasticities, in particular, suggests that it is important to direct fiscal 
instruments in such a way as to increase responsiveness as much as possible – both in the 
administered and market sectors.  It also suggests that, however well directed, any instrument large 
enough to have a significant effect on affordable housing provision will add to the pressures on 
house prices, particularly in highly constrained areas.   
 
Deadweight losses/additionality 
 
An important  element in any assessment of fiscal measures must be the extent to which the cost to 
the government will directly impact on demand or supply.  If, for instance, a tax benefit is given to 
suppliers to produce more affordable housing, how much of that payment might go to suppliers 
who would anyway have been provided the accommodation (Figure 2b)?   Other things being 
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equal, the lower the amount of benefit, the higher the proportion that will go on helping dwellings 
that would anyway be provided.  Larger payments will bring forward additional investment, so 
increasing the proportion.  The two most important questions are therefore (i) how well targeted 
can the instrument be (so as to exclude those that would anyway be prepared to supply) and (ii) 
what are the elasticities of the demand or the derived demand and supply in the relevant housing 
market?  In addition, as the instrument will almost certainly be applied to a sub-market, there is a 
question of the extent of output loss in other markets.   
 
The relevant UK comparator 
 
The current method of provision of additional affordable housing in the UK is through Social 
Housing Grant (SHG), a subsidy to providers of social housing (normally housing associations), 
together with contributions from S106.   Social Housing Grant is an up-front subsidy (implying that 
all the direct impact on public expenditure is taken in the first year).  The headline grant rate is 
68%.  The actual level depends upon the bidding process and the impact of rent restructuring.  All 
payments must be directly used for additional provision (including large-scale rehabilitation and 
transfers from the market sector).  The deadweight losses are therefore restricted to the impact on 
costs of production, including land costs and any crowding-out effect--e.g. with respect to 
provision of market-price accommodation by affordable-housing providers--as well as the potential 
loss of demand in other sectors.  Except for the substitution effect these are likely to be small.   
 
The depth of subsidy under SHG is very considerable.  However, allocation systems ensure that 
this is targeted at low-income households (except that there is little pressure on them to move on 
when their circumstances improve).  The vast majority of the benefits of SHG are tied to renting 
from housing associations.  This may be a desirable option for many households, but some 
households may prefer a smaller amount of cash and greater freedom of choice. 
 
In comparing other instruments with the existing system in the UK it is therefore appropriate to 
take account not just of the depth of subsidy and its impact on affordability but also the extent to 
which the subsidy is effectively targeted, the freedom of choice provided to the consumer and the 
benefits of spreading the public expenditure costs over time. 
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(Figure 3)  Deadweight loss from subsidy
 
P = price  PN = price with subsidy  Q = quantity  QN = quantity with subsidy   D = demand   
DN = demand with subsidy  S = supply  SN = supply with subsidy  MC = marginal cost 
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2. A typology of policies 
 
Categorisation 
 
The following matrix sets out the possible types of government intervention, in the form of 
subsidies or tax relief, to encourage affordable housing.   
 
More general fiscal measures, such as the lack of tax on imputed rents and exemption from capital 
gains tax, are not directed at affordable housing per se and therefore are not included in the matrix. 
 
 
 
 Tax Subsidy Regulation 
Demand Category 1 
1) Mortgage interest tax deductible  
2) Owner-occupiers can claim depreciation 
3) Preferential tax treatment of home-savings plans 
4) Rent payments tax deductible 
5) Tax credits for low-income tenants 
6) Exemption from transfer tax for first-time buyers 
7) Tax relief for employee on employer-run house savings schemes, 
to equate with treatment of pension contributions 
8) Property tax relief for low-income households 
9) Exemption from transfer tax for new homes 
 
Category 2 
1) Housing allowance  
2) Subsidies to savings for house purchase 
(interest subsidies or one-off grants on house 
purchase) 
3) Subsidised mortgages for low-income 
households 
4) Grants and other assistance to first-time buyers 
5) Grants for low-income buyers (not tied to 
savings) 
6) Right-to buy and other discounts for council 
tenants 
7) Improvement grants for low-income owners 
Category 3 
1) Government assigns 
housing to low-income 
households 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Supply Category 4 
Income tax 
1) Providers of social housing exempt from income tax 
2) Tax relief on investment in construction of affordable housing for 
rent or sale, to be set against income from all sources 
3) Depreciation for rental units 
4) Landlords can deduct interest on loans and operating expenses 
5) Landlords can set rental losses against other income 
6) Lower tax rate for landlords’ capital gains 
7) Tax relief for interest from mortgage-backed securities used to 
fund low-interest mortgages or low-income housing 
8) Allow capital outlays on construction/conversion of rental property 
to be offset against rental income 
9) Preferential treatment for housing-finance institutions 
10) Preferential tax treatment for employer-provided housing 
Land/property tax 
11) Taxation of empty land to encourage housebuilding 
12) Taxation of empty property to bring back into use 
13) Discount for new/renovated houses, or abatement for specified 
period 
VAT 
14) Reduced rate on conversions, new build 
15) RSLs pay lower VAT 
Category 5 
1) Grants for construction or renovation of affordable 
housing  
2) Subsidised loans for developers of affordable 
housing 
3) Provision of land for affordable housing at below 
market value or free 
4) Grants to bring empty homes back into use with 
allocation attachments 
5) Government guarantees for housing association 
loans 
6) Government guarantees of rent or mortgage 
payments from low-income households 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Category 6 
1) Require developers to 
include certain % of 
affordable housing  
2) Rent control 
3) Require employers to provide 
housing 
4) Prohibit move of rental flats 
to owner occupation 
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The Policies 
 
The main fiscal and other affordable-housing policies in the UK and 13 other countries which we identified are summarised in the following 
matrix together with short descriptions of the policy categories.   
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International affordable housing policies (followed now or recently) 
Cate-
gory 
Policy description UK USA F SP N DK B IT IR G FI AU SW CA 
1.1 Mortgage interest tax deductible • • •  • • •  •      
1.2 Owner-occupiers can claim depreciation          •     
1.3 Preferential tax treatment of home-savings plans   •       •    • 
1.4 Rent payments tax deductible        • •      
1.5 Tax credits for low-income tenants  •             
1.6 Exemption from transfer tax for first-time buyers               
1.7 Tax relief for employee on employer-run house saving schemes               
1.8 Property tax relief for low-income households •    •          
1.9 Exemption from transfer tax for new homes •        •      
2.1 Housing allowance • • • • • • •  • • • • • • 
2.2 Subsidies to savings for house purchase    •      • •    
2.3 Subsidised mortgages for low-income households   • • •         • 
2.4 Grants to first-time buyers •   •      •     
2.5 Grants for low-income buyers • •             
2.6 Right-to-buy discounts for council tenants •              
2.7  Improvement grants for low-income owners •              
4.1 Providers of social housing exempt from income tax •    • •    •     
4.2 Tax relief on investment in construction of affordable housing  •        •     
4.3 Depreciation for rental units  •        •  •  • 
4.4 Landlords can deduct interest on loans and operating expenses • •        •    • 
4.5 Landlords can set rental losses against other income  •        • •   • 
4.6 Lower tax rate for landlords’ capital gains  •             
4.7 Tax relief for interest from mortgage-backed securities for housing  •             
4.8 Landlords can set capital outlays against rental income •       • •      
4.9 Preferential tax treatment for housing-finance institutions          •     
4.10 Preferential tax treatment for employer-provided housing               
4.11 Taxation of empty land to encourage housebuilding               
4.12 Taxation of empty property to bring back into use               
4.13 Property-tax discount for new/renovated houses, or abatement •  •          •  
4.14 Reduced rate of VAT on conversions, new build    •           
4.15 RSLs pay lower VAT   •            
5.1 Grants for construction or renovation of affordable housing •  • •      •   •  
5.2 Subsidised loans for developers of affordable housing  • • •      • •  • • 
5.3 Land provided for affordable housing at below market value/free •   •    •       
5.4 Grants to refurbish empty homes w/ allocation attachments •              
5.5 Government guarantees housing association loans      •         
5.6 Government guarantees rent/mortgage payment of low-income households • • •       •     
F = France  SP = Spain  N = Netherlands  DK = Denmark  B = Belgium  IT = Italy  IR = Ireland  G = Germany  FI = Finland  AU = Australia  SW = Sweden  CA = Canada 
 
 
Category 1: Demand-side tax measures  
 
1.1 Mortgage interest tax deductible 
 
This is not necessarily a policy directed at affordable housing per se; in fact, if 
mortgage interest is deductible at the taxpayer’s marginal tax rate, the policy 
favours high earners.   
 
Owner-occupiers can no longer deduct mortgage interest payments in the UK.  
Landlords in the private rented sector can deduct interest payments as a 
business expense. 
 
Many countries allow this.  In some countries, such as the Netherlands, 
mortgage interest is deductible, but owner-occupiers are taxed on the imputed 
rental value of their homes.  In others, such as the USA, mortgage interest is 
deductible at marginal rate for all but the very largest loans, but there is no 
corresponding tax on imputed rental value.  In Belgium the amount deductible 
is related to the size of the family, and is higher for new buildings; it declines 
over time.  In France 25% of interest could be deducted up to a ceiling that 
depended on the number of children in the family and whether the building 
was new or old. The deduction is no longer allowed for purchases agreed  after 
the 1st of January ’98.  Imputed rent is not taxed. 
 
Ireland allowed deduction of 80% of mortgage interest at the marginal rate; 
this was due to change (in 1996) to standard rate.  However, 100% of mortgage 
interest is tax deductible for first-time buyers up to £5000 (married) and £2500 
(single) for the first five years after purchase. 
 
Italy allows a percentage of interest on loans for repair to be deducted. 
 
1.2 Owner-occupiers can claim depreciation 
 
In Germany owner-occupiers could deduct 5% of construction costs annually 
for the first eight years.  This was replaced in 1996 by a concession limited to 
households under a certain income threshold.  Such households could deduct 
5% of the building cost of a new house up to DM5000 annually, or 2.5% of the 
value of a second-hand house up to DM 2500 annually.  Families with children 
got extra amounts.  If this resulted in negative income tax, the credit could be 
held over to use in other years.  In 2000 this tax relief was replaced by a cash 
allowance. 
 
1.3 Preferential tax treatment of home-savings plans 
 
In Canada during the 1970s any resident non-homeowner could contribute 
$1000 per year, up to a total of $10,000, in a registered home-ownership 
savings plan.  Contributions were tax-deductible and the income was not taxed 
while in the plan.  No tax was payable if the capital and interest were used to 
buy an owner-occupied house. 
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In 1965 France introduced Housing Savings Schemes, under which households 
could save up to FF 100,000 for construction or repair of a house.  Interest was 
paid tax-free.  There was no requirement for regular deposits, and after 18 
months the saver had the right to a loan related to the size of his savings.  In 
1969 Housing Savings Plans were introduced.  The new regulations required 
regular annual deposits, and the account had to be maintained for a minimum 
of four years. 
 
In Germany, holders of Bausparkassen accounts whose income is above the 
threshold for government grants (see below) can receive interest on these 
accounts tax-free.  
 
1.4 Tax-deductible rent payments 
 
In Ireland the over-55s can treat rent to private landlords as a tax allowance.  
Italy allows low-income renters to deduct housing expenditure.  In Greece 
tenants may deduct 30% of their rent, up to 15% of taxable net income. 
 
1.5 Tax credits for low-income tenants 
 
The state of California has a small fixed renters’ tax credit (maximum 
$120/year); the legislature has proposed a special renters’ tax credit of $500 for 
entry-level teachers and police and fire officers living in high-rent areas. 
 
1.6 Exemption from transfer tax for first-time buyers 
 
Greece allows this; the size of the exemption is related to family size. 
 
1.7 Tax relief for employee on employer-run house savings schemes, similar 
to tax treatment of pension contributions 
 
In Hungary employers provide preferential loans to employees; a significant 
share of firms’ profits are spent on supporting dwelling purchases by their 
employees.  From 1995 in Switzerland, people covered by an occupational 
pension scheme were allowed to use part of their accumulated equity to 
acquire an owner-occupied dwelling, pay down existing mortgage debt, or buy 
shares in a housing co-operative.  If they were under 50 years old they could 
use all their equity; if over 50 they could use equity to the value of what they 
had at 50, or one-half. 
 
1.8 Property-tax relief for low-income households 
 
 Low-income households are eligible for council-tax benefit in the UK.  In the 
Netherlands low-income households are exempt from paying the 40% of  
property tax collected from the user of the dwelling (the other 60% is paid by 
the owner). 
 
1.9 Exemption from transfer tax for new homes  
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The UK government recently announced the abolition of stamp duty for 
purchases of dwellings in certain low-demand areas.  A price ceiling applies. 
Ireland exempts new homes from stamp duty. 
 
 
Category  2: Demand-side subsidies 
 
2.1 Housing allowance 
 
Almost all countries have some housing allowance scheme. 
 
2.2 Subsidies to savings for house purchase (interest subsidies or one-off 
grants on house purchase) 
 
The UK has the Starter Home initiative; cash-limited payments to certain key 
workers.  The German Bausparen, or contract savings and loans system, offers 
loans on the basis of specific house-savings contracts, under which borrowers 
have to make regular deposits in advance until a certain savings target is 
reached, when the they become eligible for a mortgage.  The government pays 
10% of the annual savings amount as a subsidy to low-income households.  
Spain gives grants to buyers with housing-savings accounts at the time of 
house purchase.  France pays an interest premium to savings for 
homeownership. 
 
Under a 1980 law, the Finnish government pays an interest subsidy of 70% of 
the interest rate over 4.5% for loans taken out under the ASP programmes.  
This is designed to help first-time buyers between 18 and 30 years old.  
Borrowers must have saved a down payment of 15% over at least two years.  
The interest on savings if 1% + 2-4% (negotiated with the bank) and is tax 
free.  There are upper limits on the loan sum, depending on where the dwelling 
is in Finland.  The maximum was needed in 1992 when 5% of all new housing 
loans were ASP.  Interest has risen again since upper limits were raised. 
 
2.3 Subsidised mortgages for low-income households 
 
Spain subsidises mortgages for low-income purchasers of new units of 
“regulated housing”, which must met certain criteria and be registered with the 
government.  The amount qualifying for a subsidy depends on the buyer’s 
income and the size of the dwelling.  If the buyer sells in less than five years he 
must return the subsidy with interest; if not, after five years he is re-assessed 
for continuing subsidy.  There is a similar programme for used dwellings. 
 
In Austria the state offers loans for new construction, the amount depending on 
family size.   For low-income households these loans are interest-free.  
France’s PAP programme offered subsidised loans for owner-occupation.  
These were only for principal homes for low-income borrowers; the dwelling 
had to meet certain size and cost requirements, and be new or professionally 
refurbished.  France introduced 0% mortgages for home ownership in the 
subsidised sector in 1995, and in 1993 introduced a new loan programme for 
low-income owner-occupiers who wanted to renovate their homes themselves. 
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In the Netherlands the government offers three types of subsidy, depending on 
house values.  For the cheapest houses, the government pays the principal and 
interest on a part (the size of which depends on the buyer’s income) of the 
mortgage.  The subsidy is treated as taxable income.   For somewhat more 
expensive houses there is a fixed contribution from the government for five 
years (also taxable, income cap applies).  For the third band of houses there is a 
price cap but no income cap; these attract a one-off contribution from the 
government. 
 
In New Zealand before 1993 the government subsidised loans for low-income 
wage earners.  The Australian government offers short-term help for low-
income home buyers in difficulty with mortgage repayments. 
 
In Canada in the mid-1970s the Assisted Home Ownership Programme was 
designed to enable low-income families to buy homes using less than 25% of 
their income to repay principal and interest.  A government corporation 
provided interest-free loans to buyers for five years.   
 
In Argentina households are lent 5% of the purchase price at the beginning of 
construction and up to 33% of the mortgage payments for a ten-year loan 
which they repay at 4% interest over the following ten years.  This is paid for 
by the National Housing Fund (FONAVI) originally financed from an 
employment surcharge;  now from a petrol tax. 
 
2.4 Grants to first-time buyers, Homebuy, shared ownership 
 
The Spanish region of Catalonia offers grants to buyers under 30.  Australia 
gives AUS $7000 to first-time buyers, with an additional $7000 for those who 
buy new homes (reduced to $10,000 total for 2002).  There are no income or 
dwelling-cost restrictions.  Germany offers subsidies to first-time buyers, 
related to their income level and the number of children they have. 
 
In New Zealand from 1986 to 1993 the Homestart programme offered grants to 
bridge the gap between the savings of low-income households and the required 
deposit. 
  
Ireland has a programme of shared ownership, where the house is part-owned 
by the occupier, part by the state.  The occupier pays rent on the part owned by 
the state, and mortgage repayments or interest on the rest.  The occupier can 
buy part or all of the remaining equity when his income allows. 
 
2.5 Grants for low-income buyers (not tied to house savings) 
 
In the UK: Shared ownership and DIYSO:  subsidised rental element of either 
newly built home or one from the existing market sector.  Homebuy: Interest-
free loan for a proportion of asset to make home ownership affordable.  Under 
the US 1968 Housing Act, private buyers bought homes from developers and 
paid a percentage of their income; the federal government made up the 
difference.  In Hungary, the state gives a grant to assist with down payments 
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or construction costs for families.  This can cover up to 45% of construction 
costs, depending on the number of children in the family. 
 
2.6 Right-to-buy discounts for tenants of public housing 
 
In the UK council tenants have the right to buy their dwelling at a discount 
from the market price. The size of the discount depends on how long they have 
lived there and the type of property.  Tenants incentive schemes provide 
assistance to transfer to the private sector. 
 
2.7 Improvement grants for low-income owners 
 
In the UK local authorities give grants to enable low-income owners to carry 
out certain essential repairs. 
 
Category 3: Demand-side regulations 
 
3.1 Government assigns housing to low-income households 
 
 Common for social housing in many countries. 
 
 
Category 4: Supply-side tax relief 
 
Income tax 
 
4.1 Providers of social housing exempt from income tax 
 
In the UK housing associations, as non-profit organisations, pay no income 
tax.The Netherlands and Denmark exempt providers of social housing from 
income tax.   In Germany they were exempt until 1990. 
 
4.2 Tax credits for construction of affordable housing  
 
The USA allows developers of low-income housing to take a tax credit (set 
directly against the tax bill) of 9% of reckonable construction costs annually 
for ten years.  A certain proportion of the units in the development must be for 
low-income households.  The tax credits are allocated to specific low-income 
housing projects by state housing authorities; developers raise equity by selling 
the credits (selling prices are typically about 60 cents on the dollar).  To 
qualify for the credit, the developer must undertake substantial expenditure for 
construction or rehabilitation.  The credit is earned over 15 years, but is taken 
over ten.  It is subject to recapture with interest if the project (or more than a 
one-third interest in it) is sold before the end of the 15-year compliance period, 
or if the project is not occupied by low-income households. 
 
German allows tax relief for construction of dwellings to be let at below 
market rents; a percentage of the capital invested may be set against other 
income from all sources. 
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4.2 Depreciation for rental units 
 
Landlords were permitted to depreciate their units over 15 years in the USA for 
a period during the 1980s; this has now changed to 27.5 years.  In 1990 
Germany increased the allowed rate of depreciation to try to boost the supply 
of rental housing.  
 
Australia allows investors in newly constructed private rental housing to 
depreciate their investment at a rate of 2.5% per year.  Canada allows 4%. 
  
4.3 Landlords can deduct interest on loans and operating expenses 
 
In the UK landlords receive unlimited marginal-rate tax relief on interest 
payments.  Germany, the USA and Canada allow landlords to deduct interest 
on loans and operating expenses from taxable income. 
 
4.4 Landlords can set rental losses against other income 
 
Germany, the US and Canada allow this.  In the 1960s Finland exempted 
investors in rental housing from income and property tax; these provisions 
were changed by 1972.    
 
4.5 Lower tax rate for landlords’ capital gains 
 
The USA taxed landlords’ capital gains at a special lower rate until 1986. 
 
4.6 Tax relief for interest from mortgage-backed securities used to fund low-
interest mortgages or low-income housing 
 
Such securities are issued by US states or municipalities to fund affordable 
housing. 
 
4.7 Allow capital outlays on construction/conversion of rental property to be 
offset against rental income 
 
The UK permitted this only in the flats-above-shops programme, which ran 
from 1992 to 1995. Ireland allows it.  These outlays can be deducted from 
rental income from the property in question or from other property owned by 
the landlord.  Italy allows a percentage of the cost of renovation (of rental or 
owner-occupied property) to be set directly against the income tax bill. 
 
4.9 Preferential tax treatment for housing finance institutions 
 
German Bausparen operate under a special tax regime. 
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Land/property tax 
 
4.13 Discount for new/renovated houses, or abatement for specified period 
 
 In the UK new build is zero-rated.  Renovation work attracts VAT at the full 
rate, except for certain conversion work (changing the number of units in a 
building), where VAT is applied at a reduced rate.  In Sweden new and 
renovated houses benefit from a ten-year discount on property tax.  In France 
new homes are exempted from land taxes; construction for the private rented 
sector is exempt from land tax for two years. All new dwellings are exempted 
from property tax for two years 
 
VAT 
 
4.14 Reduced rate on conversions, new build 
 
Spain gives a discount of 6% on VAT for new homes. 
 
4.15 RSLs pay lower VAT 
 
In France HLM organisations (like RSLs) pay a lower rate of VAT. 
 
 
Category 5:  Supply-side subsidies 
 
5.1 Grants for construction or renovation of affordable housing 
 
In the UK providers of social housing receive Approved Development 
Programme (ADP) funding for construction or acquisition and rehabilitation of 
rental units and shared ownership accommodation.  Local authorities also 
provide Social Housing Grant. 
 
Spain provides grants of 10 to 25% for the cost of building affordable housing.  
Sweden provides grants for developers (private or public) building affordable 
rental housing.  There is a cost ceiling, and the developer must make a 
commitment to rent to low-income households.  The grant covers 
approximately 15% of building costs. 
 
Germany provides subsidies at a level designed to cover all costs exceeding the 
predetermined social (below-market) rent.  The dwellings must meet certain 
standards, and tenancies are open to certain groups only.  Social rents are 
essentially fixed; only some cost-based rent increases are allowed. 
 
Switzerland offers a six-year subsidy to encourage renovation of existing 
housing (not necessarily affordable).  It covers 2% of the total cost of 
upgrading the housing unit. 
 
France offered a grant of 12.7% of the cost of schemes to construct new social 
housing, or to renovate existing stock.  This was associated with a subsidised 
loan (PLA).  Private developers were also eligible, if their developments met 
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certain physical standards and they observed rent limits.  A higher level of 
grant—20%--was available for developments aimed at very low-income 
households; permitted rents were correspondingly lower.  Another scheme 
(ANAH) was created to improve existing rented stock owned by private 
landlords.  It covers 25% of improvement costs up to a standard limit; 
buildings must be over 15 years old.  There are no constraints on rents for 
housing improved using an ANAH grant, but the renter is eligible for a higher 
housing allowance if the landlord accepts rent regulation. Homeowners under a 
certain income ceiling are eligible for another grant (PAH).  The ANAH and 
PAH grants cover 20 to 35% of repair costs up to a standard cost limit. 
 
5.2 Subsidised loans for developers of affordable housing 
 
Spain provides subsidised loans, as well as grants.  The USA provides them 
subject to rents remaining below a specified level for 20 years.  Germany 
provides preferential loans to public or private-sector providers of affordable 
housing; the dwellings must be operated as social housing for a period of 30 
years (originally 60).  Lettings are restricted to certain income groups, and 
rents are held below market level.  Sweden subsidises interest for new 
construction or renovation; the subsidy decreases year by year, and is 
calculated on the basis of a standardised investment cost rather than actual 
cost.  The subsidy is available to developers of both private and social housing, 
and is not targeted to low-income groups.  Interest subsidies are now being 
phased out. 
 
In Finland after 1949 the state granted low-interest loans for construction of 
rental units (covering 60% of costs) or single-family homes (40%); there was 
no income restriction at first.  The government still grants low-cost 
construction loans, but now eligibility is limited by household income and 
family size.  Equally 80% of the government subsidised production is to be 
concentrated in the six growing regions with 50% in Helsinki alone. 
 
Canada’s Assisted Rental Program, which ran only from 1975 to 1978, offered 
concessionary loans over ten years to facilitate the construction of affordable 
private rented housing. 
 
France’s grant programme for social housing (described above) includes an 
element of subsidised loan. 
 
5.3 Provision of land for affordable housing at below market value or free 
 
 UK local authorities may provide their own land for social housing.  
Traditionally they built the housing themselves; more recently they have 
developed it in partnership with either housebuilders or housing associations.  
Where a local authority sold land for less than market value it would normally 
expect to receive nomination rights to social housing in return. 
 
In Italy, local authorities are empowered to acquire, by compulsory purchase, 
land for housing programmes.  Spain also provides land for housing. 
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5.4 Grants to bring empty homes back into use with allocation attachments 
 
 These exist in the UK, and are local-authority based. 
 
5.5 Government guarantees for housing association loans 
 
In Denmark local and central government guarantee housing-association 
borrowing. 
 
5.6 Government guarantees of rent or mortgage payments from low-income 
households 
 
 In the UK the possibility exists but it is not used, except in the case of payment 
of mortgage interest for certain unemployed people on income support.  
Mortgage Payment Protection Insurance is not government guaranteed. 
The French government guarantees rent payments.  The US government, 
through the Federal Housing Administration, Ginnie Mae and Fannie Mac, 
guarantees the mortgage payments of low-income borrowers.  In eastern 
German states the federal government has introduced public guarantees for 
private mortgages, to overcome the requirement for high down payments. 
 
 
Category 6: Supply-side regulations 
 
6.1 Require developers to include a certain percentage of affordable housing 
in new developments 
 
In the UK, Section 106 can be used to enforce such requirements.  There is a 
minimum development size (smaller in London than elsewhere).  At the 
moment this is applied only to residential development, not commercial except 
in one or two authorities. 
 
 Rural exceptions sites may be identified at the parish level to provide 
affordable housing for local needs.  Public-sector organisations must sell land 
at the best consideration – this may enable them to sell at below market value 
in order to obtain nominations. 
 
In Ireland, under the Planning and Development Act 2000, local authorities can 
acquire up to 20% of the area of development sites purchased by private 
developers for affordable housing, paying either existing use or agricultural 
value. 
 
Sweden is changing its cadastral system to make possible mixed-used 
development and especially low-cost housing in areas not zoned or intended 
for residential use. 
 
6.2 Rent control 
 
The UK has rent control for social housing.  Denmark has traditional rent 
regulation for private rental housing, with low legal maximum rents.  Many 
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countries—for example Switzerland and Germany—control rents for dwellings 
built with government subsidies.  Landlords are permitted to set rents at a level 
that will cover costs only. 
 
In Austria, rent levels of almost all rented flats in multi-storey buildings are 
restricted by government legislation.  There are rent limits for both new and 
existing tenancy contracts.  Rent increases for existing tenants are allowed only 
for inflation or to cover urgent maintenance. 
 
6.3 Require employers to provide housing 
 
This was common practice in transition economies. 
 
6.4 Prohibit move of rental flats to owner occupation 
 
In Germany, local regulations inhibit the movement of rental flats into 
homeownership. 
 
 
Category 7: Other measures 
 
7 Advice to low-income households on homeownership 
 
The UK provides some.  In the US, the government provides advice on passing 
credit tests and managing mortgage commitments. It is often organised through 
Community Development Corporations (CDCs) and targeted at ethnic minority 
groups, whose levels of owner occupation are lower. 
 
 
3. A Package of Measures for the UK 
 
After examination of the international evidence and of the specific UK environment 
and experience, six policies and associated measures were identified as having 
potential in the UK environment: 
 
1. Tax incentives for construction of affordable housing, allowing costs to be set 
against other income (tax relief) or offering a pound-for-pound reduction in 
the amount of tax payable (tax credits).  They could be applied to both rented 
housing and housing built for owner-occupation or shared-equity schemes. 
 
2. An instrument to provide government assistance to purchasers of housing in 
high-cost areas, structured to bring in a wider range of lower-income workers 
than current programmes, and probably geographically targeted.  This would 
build on existing, more narrowly based, programmes such as the Starter Home 
Initiative. 
 
3. Savings schemes for first-time buyers, which might include an employer 
element – including, for instance, allowing tax reliefs for mortgage savings 
similar to those given to pensions.  Schemes of this type, while they have 
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fallen out of general use, have been reintroduced to help particular groups in a 
number of countries. 
 
4. Policies to increase employer involvement, which would reintroduce an old 
established practice and make it tax efficient for employers to play a direct 
role in assisting their workers.  Related to this is the question of whether 
modifications of the Treasury rule on “best consideration” rule could be 
clarified to make clear that public-sector employers could use their land to 
provide affordable housing for their employees, particularly in London.) 
 
5. Ways of encouraging mixed-use or housing-only development on sites 
previously designated for non-residential development. This might include 
extending Section 106 agreements to non-residential sites (which have both 
the potential for providing additional land for housing, and may generate the 
need for more affordable housing) as well as fiscal incentives to lubricate this 
process. 
 
6. Reduction of Value Added Tax (VAT) on renovation of affordable housing 
(perhaps in the first instance by exempting Registered Social Landlords). 
 
 
Initial Assessment 
 
Certain questions are fundamental to an assessment of new affordable-housing 
policies: What is the depth of subsidy involved?  Will it produce the desired results?  
What will be the deadweight losses?  Will the policy have any effect on land supply? 
 
Policy 1 is consistent with the Treasury’s general approach to modernising the tax and 
benefit framework – although the potential for a secondary market in credits is more 
problematic. A new tax-incentive scheme has just been introduced England in the 
form of the Community Investment Tax Credit, which gives investors tax incentives 
for investing in community development institutions.  The existence of this precedent 
would make it easier to implement Policy 1 through an affordable-housing tax 
incentive that concentrated on particular areas, dwelling types and occupant groups.  
Such a scheme would work most effectively if the credits can be traded and land 
supply increased. 
 
Policy 2, which would extend Homebuy and the Starter Homes Initiative into a more 
coherent but carefully targeted scheme, appears appropriate, as it could help fulfil the 
reasonable aspirations of lower-income employed households. 
 
Savings schemes (Policy 3) could only provide very limited help unless it was 
possible to extending income-tax relief to employer contributions to mortgage 
payments, but this goes against general tax principles. 
 
Employers (Policy 4) clearly have a potential role as partners in Policy 1.  They could 
also provide land, develop shared-equity schemes and facilitate the implementation of 
other fiscal instruments.  Whether employers become involved will depend partly on 
whether they perceive particular relative advantages to providing housing assistance 
rather than increased pay. 
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Policy 5 would level the playing field between residential and non-residential sites in 
terms of the requirement to provide affordable housing.  It could increase the number 
of sites coming forward for residential and particularly affordable-housing use; 
however, it would have to be combined with fiscal incentives such as Policy 1 to 
generate large-scale changes. 
 
Reducing the VAT rate on renovation (Policy 6) to 5%--the minimum permissible 
under EU regulations--would reduce the cost of providing affordable housing through 
renovation.  Restricting the tax reduction to RSLs would concentrate the policy on 
affordable housing and make it easier to monitor. 
 
There are a number of modifications to the more general framework which could 
make policies more effective.  They include in particular (i) clarifying the definition 
of best consideration so it includes allocating land for affordable housing at sub-
market prices and (ii) developing standard contracts and transparent frameworks for 
shared-equity arrangements, so that both employers and employees can better evaluate 
the schemes.  Increasing the scale of shared-equity schemes so as to encourage the 
involvement of institutional investors could generate large benefits, but these are a 
long way off. 
 
Overall there is a strong case for experimenting with Policy 1 (tax incentives) and for 
developing a more coherent approach to demand assistance as described in Policy 2 
(assistance to purchasers in high-cost areas).  The other policies can act in support of 
these two more fundamental changes. 
 
The only policy that would directly increase the supply of land devoted to affordable 
housing is Policy 5 (housing on non-residential land). Clarifying the rules on best 
consideration (see Policy 4 - employer involvement) could also bring a limited 
amount of land into residential use.  Policy 1 (tax incentives) could indirectly 
stimulate an increase in land supply (assuming the planning system permitted 
adjustment), because it would give developers an incentive to look for additional land 
on which to build.   
 
None of these policies would address the same needs as Social Housing Grant, which 
is concentrated on lower-income households with longer-term needs, and provides 
higher subsidies and greater targeting.  Instead they could supplement that provision 
by bringing in different players, greater choice and a more market-oriented approach.  
As such they could fill an important, and increasingly recognised, gap in government 
incentive structures.  They would however generate some deadweight losses from 
transactions costs and inadequate targeting. They would work best if their use could 
be directly combined with expansion of land supply. 
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4. Conclusions 
 
In the UK owner-occupation is now effectively treated as a consumption good.  It is 
therefore tax-free except for stamp duty and the price-related part of council tax, 
while the costs of owner-occupation are taxed.  For private rented housing, on the 
other hand, the landlord is subject to income tax (with cost deductions, but no 
depreciation) and to capital gains tax – housing is thus treated as an investment good. 
 
Other interventions – especially housing benefit – lower the cost of renting to low-
income households, but there is nothing to provide regular assistance for low-income 
owners.  There is a patchwork of other policies, including right-to-buy discounts, 
Homebuy, the Starter Homes Initiative, and improvement grants, but with the 
exception of right-to-buy these have a limited effect. 
 
In general there is much less subsidy now than a few years ago.  The main remaining 
subsidies are concentrated at the bottom end of the market, mainly through housing 
benefit.  There are very few mechanisms outside Social Housing Grant directly to 
assist additional provision. 
 
Internationally there is a wide range of both demand-side and supply-side instruments.  
These have been applied both quite generally to increase production and in a more 
concentrated fashion targeting either affordable housing or particular groups.  Almost 
every element of our typology can be found somewhere in the countries that we 
examined. 
 
Ssome countries have emphasised tax reliefs, while others concentrate on grants – the 
choice relates more to their general fiscal ideology than to the problems, which they 
address.  Overall, the policies often look more as if they just grew in response to 
particular political pressures rather than representing a coherent approach to ensuring 
adequate affordable housing.  A general trend in most countries has been the move 
towards less general assistance and increasing concentration on particular low-income 
groups and localities.  Evaluation of these policies depends on a reasonable 
understanding of the overall tax systems and housing markets in the relevant 
countries. Transferring policies to another institutional environment is always 
problematic. 
 
It is not surprising, therefore, that any package seen as potentially feasible in the UK 
is likely to be based more on developing existing structures and wider fiscal 
innovations then on lessons from international experience.  Even so much can be 
learned about both problems and potential solutions. 
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